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Abstract
We identify a class of noncooperative games in continuous strate-
gies which are best-response potential games. We identify the condi-
tions for the existence of a best-response potential function and char-
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equilibrium. The theoretical analysis is accompanied by applications
to oligopoly and monetary policy games.
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1 Introduction
A recent stream of research, stemming from Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988)
and Monderer and Shapley (1996), has investigated the concept of exact
potential game, whereby the information about Nash equilibria is nested
into a single real-valued function (the potential function) over the strategy
space. The specific feature of a potential function defined for a given game
is that the gradient of the corresponding potential function coincides with
the vector of first derivatives of the individual payoﬀ functions of the original
game itself.1
However, the relevant information about the Nash equilibrium can be
collected by imposing a weaker requirement, leading to the class of best-
response potential games, as defined by Voorneveld (2000), which contains
the class of exact potential games as a proper subset. The requirement
used by Voorneveld is that the strategy profile maximizing the best-response
potential function coincides with that identifying the Nash equilibrium.
In this paper we investigate a class of games in which the i-th player
has a payoﬀ function consisting in the product of her strategy times the
generic power of a function of all players’ strategies, the latter function be-
ing invariant across the population of players. First, we identify a suﬃcient
condition for the existence of the best-response potential function for this
game and illustrate the explicit construction procedure of the best-response
potential function. Then, we also identify a suﬃcient condition for (i) the
Nash equilibrium of the original game to be unique, and (ii) the correspond-
1The main directions along which the research on potential games has been carried
out in recent years are, inter alia, (i) the relationship between strategic complementar-
ity/substitutability and potential games (Braˆnzei et al., 2003; Dubey et al., 2006); (ii) the
construction of a potential function for perfect information games (Kukushkin, 2002); (iii)
the existence of correlated equilibria in potential games (Neyman, 1997; Ui, 2008); and
coalition formation in potential games (Ui, 2000; Slikker, 2001).
2
ing best-response potential function to have a linear-quadratic form. Addi-
tionally, in the two-player case, we establish that if the Nash equilibrium is
asymptotically stable (respectively, unstable), then the best-response poten-
tial function is concave (resp., convex), and conversely. This is followed by
examples related to oligopoly theory and international monetary policy.
2 The best-response potential game
We consider a one-shot noncooperative full information game defined as Γ =­
N, (Si)i∈N , (πi (s))i∈N
®
, where
• N = {1, 2, 3, ...n} is the set of players;
• Si ⊂ [0,+∞) is the compact strategy space for player i;
• πi(s) is the profit function attributing a payoﬀ to i in correspondence
of any given admissible outcome s = (s1, . . . , sn), s ∈ S = S1× . . .×Sn,
of the following kind:
πi(s) = (f(s))ksi, (1)
where f (s) ∈ C2(S), f(s) ≥ 0, k ∈ R+. The game takes place under
simultaneous play, and we confine our attention to the case where πi(s)
is such that at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does exist.
Our analysis in the remainder of this section treats the case where the
system of first order conditions has more than one critical point.
As a preliminary step, we recall the definition of potential function bor-
rowed from physics:
Definition 1 A vector field F = (F1(s), . . . , Fn(s)) is called conservative
if there exists a diﬀerentiable function P (s) such that:
∂P (s)
∂si
= Fi (s) , i = 1, . . . , n.
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P (s) is called a potential function for F .
If a game admits a potential function P , then it is an exact potential
game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996). However, there are
games that do not admit a potential function but meet a weaker requirement
leading to the construction of a best-response potential function in the sense
of Voorneveld (2000). The definition of a best-response potential game is the
following:
Definition 2 (Voorneveld, 2000) Γ =
­
N, (Si)i∈N , (πi (s))i∈N
®
is a best-
response potential game if there exists a function bP (s) : S → R such that
argmax
si∈Si
πi(s) = argmax
si∈Si
bP (s) ∀i ∈ N, ∀s−i ∈ S−i.
The function bP (s) is called a best-response potential function for the
game Γ.
Our interest in the chance to build a best-reponse potential function bP (s)
for a strategic game stems from the fact that if bP (s) attains its maximum
over S in correspondence of s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n), then the game has a Nash
equilibrium in s∗ (see Voorneveld, 2000, Proposition 2.2, p. 290).
In order to construct the best-response potential function for the game
under consideration, we need the following:
Definition 3 We call fictitious profit functions the functions bπi : S −→
R obtained by the following integration:
bπi(s) = Z µf(·) + ksi∂f(·)∂si
¶
dsi + ξi(s),
where ∂ξi(s)/∂si = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Relying upon Definitions 1-3, we may prove:
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Proposition 4 s∗ is an interior maximum for the fictitious profit functionsbπi if and only if it is a maximum for the profit functions πi too.
Proof. s∗ is an interior maximum for the fictitious profit functions if and
only if the following conditions hold:
f(s∗) + ks∗i
∂f(s∗)
∂si
= 0, (2)
∂2bπi(s∗)
∂s2i
=
∂f(s∗)
∂si
+ k
∂f(s∗)
∂si
+ ks∗i
∂2f(s∗)
∂s2i
< 0. (3)
It follows that if we evaluate the second partial derivative of the profit func-
tions in s∗, we have:
∂2πi(s∗)
∂s2i
= (f(s∗))k−1
∂2bπi(s∗)
∂s2i
< 0,
because f(·) is nonnegative by definition. This condition, together with the
first order condition, ensures that s∗ is an interior maximum for πi too.
Vice versa, suppose that s∗ maximizes all profit functions πi. Then, the
first order conditions on πi imply (2), and by substitution in the second
partial derivative we obtain (3).
W.r.t. the game Γ defined above, we can prove:
Proposition 5 If the vector fieldµ
f(s) + ks1
∂f(s)
∂s1
, . . . , f(s) + ksn
∂f(s)
∂sn
¶
(4)
is conservative in S, then Γ is a best-response potential game.
Proof. We start by writing down the first order conditions for the i-th
player:
∂πi(s)
∂si
= (f(s))k + k(f(s))k−1si
∂f(s)
∂si
(5)
= (f(s))k−1
µ
f(s) + ksi
∂f(s)
∂si
¶
= 0.
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If there exists a strategy s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n) ∈ S such that (f(s∗))k−1 = 0, then
πi(s∗) vanishes too and that is a zero profit strategy, so we can restrict our
analysis to the second factor. Analogously, if (f(s))k−1 has no zeros, we have
to focus on the second factor as well. We define:
∂bπi(s)
∂si
= f(s) + ksi
∂f(s)
∂si
= 0
as the fictitious first order condition. If the vector field
³
∂bπ1
∂s1
, . . . , ∂bπn∂sn
´
is
conservative in S, then there exists a function bP (s) such that
∂ bP
∂si
=
∂bπi
∂si
, i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, on the basis of Definitions 2-3 and Proposition 4, Γ is a best-
response potential game.
2.1 Constructing the best-response potential function
Here we illustrate the construction procedure yielding bP (s). The first step to
this aim is the following definition:
Definition 6 We call the total fictitious profit function the sum of all
fictitious profit functions:
bΠ(s) = nX
j=1
bπj(s). (6)
In the remainder of the section we will omit the arguments for simplicity.
The partial derivative of the total fictitious profit function can be decomposed
as follows:
∂bΠ
∂si
=
∂bπi
∂si
+ φi, (7)
where
φi =
∂
∂si
ÃX
j 6=i
bπj! . (8)
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The crucial additional step is to build up the potential function, that we label
as bΦ, of the conservative vector field (φ1, . . . , φn) measuring the diﬀerence
between the total fictitious profit function bΠ and the best-response potential
function bP of Γ :
Proposition 7 If the vector field (φ1, . . . , φn) is conservative with a potentialbΦ, the function bP := bΠ− bΦ (9)
is the best-response potential function of the game Γ.
Proof. If bΦ is the potential function for the conservative vector field (φ1, . . . , φn),
then
φi =
∂bΦ
∂si
,
then it immediately follows that
∂ bP
∂si
=
∂bΠ
∂si
− ∂
bΦ
∂si
=
∂bπi
∂si
+ φi −
∂bΦ
∂si
=
∂bπi
∂si
,
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
2.2 Equilibrium properties
Propositions 5 and 7 immediately entail the following relevant Corollary:
Corollary 8 For any k ∈ R+, if f is linear in si for all i = 1, 2, ...n, then
the fictitious first order conditions are linear as well. Consequently, if a Nash
equilibrium exists in pure strategies, it is necessarily unique and follows from
the maximization of a best-response potential function bP which is linear-
quadratic in si for all i = 1, 2, ...n.
That is, if f is linear, then, irrespective of k, a simple linear-quadratic
function sums up all of the relevant information associated with the optimal
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behaviour of players taking part in Γ.2 The next Proposition establishes a
relation between interior maxima of the best-response potential function bP
and the asymptotic stability of Nash equilibria of the game Γ :
Proposition 9 Suppose the game admits a best-response potential function,
and take N = {1, 2} . If the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable (un-
stable), then the best-response potential function is concave (convex), and
conversely.
Proof. In a two-player best-response potential game endowed with a best-
response potential bP (s1, s2), the Hessian matrix H ³ bP (s∗)´ evaluated in the
Nash equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2) takes the following form:
H
³ bP (s∗)´ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂f(s∗)
∂s1
+ k ∂f(s
∗)
∂s1
+ ks∗1
∂2f(s∗)
∂s21
∂f(s∗)
∂s2
+ ks∗1
∂2f(s∗)
∂s1∂s2
∂f(s∗)
∂s1
+ ks∗2
∂2f(s∗)
∂s1∂s2
∂f(s∗)
∂s2
+ k ∂f(s
∗)
∂s2
+ ks∗2
∂2f(s∗)
∂s22
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
The conditions for s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2) to be a maximum are:
∂f(s∗)
∂si
+ k
∂f(s∗)
∂si
+ ks∗i
∂2f(s∗)
∂s2i
< 0, i = 1, 2 (10)
detH
³ bP (s∗)´ > 0. (11)
On the other hand, the conditions for the equilibrium point to be an asymp-
totically stable Nash equilibrium are:3µ
∂2π1 (s∗)
∂s21
¶µ
∂2π2 (s∗)
∂s22
¶
−
µ
∂2π1 (s∗)
∂s1∂s2
¶µ
∂2π2 (s∗)
∂s2∂s1
¶
> 0. (12)
Since this game’s profit functions are πi(s) = (f(s))ksi, i = 1, 2, condition
(12) becomes Ω > Ξ, where:
Ω ≡
µ
∂f(s∗)
∂s1
+ k
∂f(s∗)
∂s1
+ ks∗1
∂2f(s∗)
∂s21
¶µ
∂f(s∗)
∂s2
+ k
∂f(s∗)
∂s2
+ ks∗2
∂2f(s∗)
∂s22
¶
2Of course, an analogous form obtains in the special case where f is linear and k = 1,
in which, however, there’s no need to resort to a potential function in the first place.
3See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 24-25), inter alia.
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and
Ξ ≡
µ
∂f(s∗)
∂s1
+ ks∗2
∂2f(s∗)
∂s1∂s2
¶µ
∂f(s∗)
∂s2
+ ks∗1
∂2f(s∗)
∂s2∂s1
¶
,
and it is easy to see that (11) and (12) coincide. An analogous proof holds
in the case of convexity.
This result, in addition to being useful in the remainder where we will
provide examples, represents also a desirable instrument to identify stable
Nash equilibria in those cases where the system of first order conditions (5)
yields more than one critical point, by looking at the Hessian matrix of the
best-response potential function only.
3 Examples
We start with an example related to oligopolistic Cournot competition (to
this regard, see also Slade, 1994, and Monderer and Shapley, 1996). The next
proposition investigates the simple case in which f(·) is a demand function,
linear in the quantities of n firms, each one selling a diﬀerentiated variety of
the same product. Hence, the demand function for variety i writes as
pi(s) =
Ã
a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!k
, a, b > 0 (13)
where (i) the exogenous parameter γ ∈ [−b, b] measures product comple-
mentarity/substitutability (as in Singh and Vives, 1984, inter alia), and (ii)
k > 0, so that (13) is convex for all k ∈ (0, 1) , linear if k = 1 and concave
for all k > 1. Production costs are normalised to zero.
Proposition 10 Every game Γ where the profit functions are:
πi(s) =
Ã
a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!k
si, (14)
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with k ∈ R+, admits the unique best-response potential function (up to an
additive constant):
bP (s) = −(k + 1)b
2
nX
j=1
s2j +
nX
j=1
Ã
a− b
X
l 6=j
sl
!
sj + γ
X
l 6=i
slsi. (15)
Proof. The first order conditions of the maximization problem are the fol-
lowing:
∂πi
∂si
= −kb
Ã
a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!k−1
si +
Ã
a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!k
=
=
Ã
a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!k−1
·
Ã
−kbsi + a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!
= 0.
Given that a− bsi − γ
P
j 6=i sj > 0, the fictitious first order condition is:
∂bπi
∂si
= −kbsi + a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj.
Integration with respect to the i-th strategy yields:
bπi(s) = Z ∂bπi∂si dsi = −(k + 1)b2 s2i +
Ã
a− γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!
si + z.
Consequently, by summation we obtain the total fictitious profit function:
bΠ(s) = nX
i=1
"
−(k + 1)b
2
s2i +
Ã
a− γ
X
j 6=i
sj
!
si
#
+ Z,
where z, Z are the constants of integration. It is easy to check that:
∂bΠ
∂si
=
∂bπi
∂si
+ φi,
where
φi =
X
j 6=i
∂bπj
∂si
= −γ
X
j 6=i
sj.
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Finally, by calling bP = bΠ+ γX
j 6=i
sisj,
we have that:
∂ bP
∂si
= −kbsi + a− bsi − γ
X
j 6=i
sj =
∂bπi
∂si
,
whereby bP qualifies as a best-response potential function for the game Γ.
The previous proposition can be applied to the Cournot oligopoly game
as in Anderson and Engers (1992) by taking the following values: a = 1, b =
1, γ = 1, k = 1/α, α > 0 :
Proposition 11 For all α > 0, the Cournot game with non linear demand is
a best-response potential game with a linear-quadratic best-response potential
function:
bP (s) = nX
i=1
si
2
"
2α
Ã
1−
X
i6=j
sj
!
− si (1 + α)
#
+
X
i 6=j
αsisj. (16)
Proof. See Dragone and Lambertini (2008).
To conclude this example, note that here f (s) is linear and therefore the
related best-response potential function has indeed a linear-quadratic form.
The second example deals with a well known model belonging to inter-
national monetary economics, that can be traced back to Hamada (1976,
1979).4 This is a simple Keynesian two-country model where countries are
connected by international trade. The price level is p worldwide, and it is
exogenously given. The exchange rate is also fixed. The nominal money
supply in country i is Mi = Ri + Di, where Ri is the amount of interna-
tional reserves held by i’s central bank and Di measures total liabilities of
its banking system. Per-country as well as worldwide international reserves
4See also Canzoneri and Gray (1983, 1985).
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W = Ri+Rj are assumed to be fixed in the short run. The equilibrium in the
money market of country i corresponds to the condition Mi/p = Li (Yi, ri) ,
where Li (Yi, ri) = ηYi − νri is the demand for money, with η, ν > 0.
The utility function of country i’s policy maker is
Ui (Di, Yi, Yj) = (Yi + σYj)
k ¡D −Di¢ , (17)
where σ ∈ [0, k + 1] measures the role played by country j’s national income
Yj in relation to the objective of the policy maker of country i, manoeuvring
liabilities Di ∈
£
0,D
¤
so as to maximise (17) in a non-cooperative simulta-
neous game. Parameter D is the ceiling beyond which, by assumption, the
price level ceases to be stable at p; i.e., any Di > D would cause inflation at
the world level.
When the money market of country i is in equilibrium, the following
relation holds:
Yi =
Ri +Di + pνr
ηp
(18)
showing, in line with Hamada (1976, 1979), that ∂Yi/∂Di = 1/ (ηp) > 0. The
utility function of country i’s policy maker becomes:
Ui (Di, Dj) =
µ
Ri +Di + pνr
ηp
+ σ
Rj +Dj + pνr
ηp
¶k ¡
D −Di
¢
, (19)
with the first order condition:
∂Ui (Di,Dj)
∂Di
=
½
1
ηp
£
kD −Di (1 + k)−Ri − σRj+ (20)
−νrp (1 + σ)− σDj]
µ
Ri +Di + pνr
ηp
+ σ
Rj +Dj + pνr
ηp
¶k−1)
= 0
so that the relevant fictitious first order condition is
1
ηp
£
kD −Di (1 + k)−Ri − σRj − νrp (1 + σ)− σDj
¤
= 0. (21)
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Let D˜i = D−Di, D˜j = D−Dj, a =
£
Ri + σRj + (Dj + pνr)(1 + σ)
¤
/ (ηp) ,
b = 1/ (ηp) and γ = σ/ (ηp) , so that (19) can be written as
Ui
³
D˜i, D˜j
´
=
⎛
⎝
Ri +D − D˜i + pνr + σ
³
Rj +D − D˜j + pνr
´
ηp
⎞
⎠
k
D˜i
=
³
a− bD˜i − γD˜j
´k
D˜i.
Then Propositions 5 and 7 can be applied to derive the best-response poten-
tial function of the game:
bP (D˜i, D˜j) = −(k + 1)
2ηp
2X
j=1
D˜2j + (22)
2X
j=1
Ã
Ri + σRj + (D + pνr)(1 + σ)− D˜i
ηp
!
D˜j +
σ
ηp
D˜iD˜j.
This function is a semidefinite negative quadratic form if and only if σ ≤ k+1.
That is, the corresponding Hessian matrix is semidefinite negative in the
range σ ≤ 1 + k, wherein the Nash equilibrium is stable. Hence, we may
state:
Proposition 12 The monetary policy coordination game based upon objec-
tive functions (17) is a best-response potential game.
As in the previous example, also here f (s) is linear and therefore Corol-
lary 8 applies.
4 Concluding remarks
We have investigated a class of noncooperative full information games, out-
lining necessary and suﬃcient conditions whereby the corresponding vector
13
field is conservative, and therefore these games are indeed best-response po-
tential ones. In addition to the theoretical analysis, we have also provided
examples based on Cournot oligopoly and a game of international coordina-
tion of monetary policies.
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